The reality of revelation was one of the fundamental questions that\noccupied George Tyrrell as a writer until he died on 15 July 1909. The\ncentenary of his death is an opportune time to engage this English\nModernist in a dialogue with Karl Rahner on the subject of revelation.\nTyrrell insists on the primacy of the interior experience of revelation.\nAn exaggerated emphasis on inner religious experience, however, led him\ninevitably to a separation of the interior dimension of revelation from\nits verbal expressions and doctrinal formulations.\nRahner also (...) affirms the primacy of the originating inner experience of\nGod but stresses at the same time the intrinsic unity between this\ntranscendental revelation and its categorical, historical dimension.\nRevelation corresponds to the symbolic nature of the addressee. The\nMystery of the Incarnation is the point of reference for understanding\nGod's self-communication. The fullness of revelation has been realized\nin the indissoluble and irreversible unity of the Divine Logos with the\nMan Jesus. (shrink)

People accept conclusions of valid conditional inferences (e.g., if p then q, p therefore q) less, the more disablers (circumstances that prevent q to happen although p is true) exist. We investigated whether rules that through their phrasing exclude disablers evoke higher acceptance ratings than rules that do not exclude disablers. In three experiments we re-phrased content-rich conditionals from the literature as either universal or existential rules and embedded these rules in Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences. In Experiments 2 (...) and 3, we also used abstract rules. The acceptance of conclusions increased when the rule was phrased with “all” instead of “some” and the number of disablers had a higher impact on existential rules than on universal rules. Further, the effect of quantifier was more pronounced for abstract rules and when tested within subjects. We discuss the relevance of phrasing, quantifiers and knowledge on reasoning. (shrink)

Conditional inferences can be phrased with unspecific terms (“If a person is on a diet, then the person loses weight. A person is on a diet. The person loses weight”) or specific terms (“If Anna is on a diet, then Anna loses weight. Anna is on a diet. Anna loses weight”). We investigate whether the specificity of terms affects people's acceptance of inferences. In Experiment 1, inferences with specific terms received higher acceptance ratings than inferences with unspecific terms. In Experiments (...) 2 and 3, we used the same problems as in Experiment 1 but also problems with unspecific terms in the conditional and specific terms in the categorical and vice versa. When the conditional and the categorical had the same specificity, results were as in Experiment 1. When the specificity of the conditional and the categorical mismatched, acceptance ratings were lower. Our results illustrate the importance of phrasing on reasoning. (shrink)

Probabilistic theories of reasoning assume that people use their prior knowledge to estimate the conditional probability of q given p and that this probability predicts the acceptance of modus ponens inferences. But how do people reason with unfamiliar conditionals for which they do not have prior knowledge? Reasoning without prior knowledge has been extensively investigated in experiments in which participants were instructed to reason deductively. But it is still not clear how people reason with unfamiliar conditionals when they are instructed (...) to reason as in daily life. Can probabilities also predict reasoning with unfamiliar content? In two experiments we instructed participants to reason as in everyday life and to evaluate conclusions from familiar and unfamiliar conditionals. Results showed that reasoning with familiar conditionals can be predicted by the conditional probability. For unfamiliar conditionals, however, this was not the case. Conclusions from unfamiliar conditionals were accepted more strongly than what could be expected according to their conditional probability. Our findings challenge probabilistic theories of reasoning and suggest that other approaches, such as a dual-strategy model, describe our results more adequately. (shrink)

In defeasible reasoning, initially drawn conclusions can be withdrawn in light of new information. In this paper, we examine how the conclusions drawn from conditionals describing positive or negative situations can be defeated by subsequent negative or positive information, respectively. Participants were confronted with conditionals of the form “If [situation], then I am happy/sad” which were either followed by no additional information or by additional information describing situations of the same or the opposite valence. The participant's task was to decide (...) on a question asking for a possible conclusion (“Am I happy?” vs. “Am I sad?”). We found a negativity bias in defeasible reasoning: negative information defeated positively charged conclusions more strongly than positive information defeated negatively charged conclusions. We discuss our results in relation to the new psychology of reasoning. (shrink)

No es posible una comprensión integral del influyente pensamiento de Anselmo de Canterbury (1033-1109) sin incluir su concepción de la verdad. La articulación entre la famosa demostración de Dios en el "Proslogion" con sus ideas acerca de la libertad en su "Tratado sobre la libertad del albedrío", mediadas por sus planteamientos sobre el origen y el significado del mal en su "Tratado sobre la caída del demonio", requiere centrarse en la presente obra. La presente edición está acompañada de una serie (...) de ensayos sobre el problema de la verdad en la Antigüedad y en la Edad Media que pasa por Aristóteles, Agustín de Hipona, Boecio, Dionisio Areopagita, Tomás de Aquino, Ockham y otros. (shrink)

El resultado más importante de la epistemología de Evandro Agazzi ha sido probablemente la elaboración de un concepto analógico de ciencia, en el sentido de que, después de haber caracterizado la ciencia como conocimiento objetivo y riguroso, ha mostrado que estas dos características se satisfacen de forma diferente según las condiciones epistémicas, ontológicas y pragmáticas del conocimiento, dando lugar a las diferentes ciencias, naturales, humanas o sociales. El presente artículo subraya el hecho de que cada ciencia se caracteriza entonces por (...) su propia forma de racionalidad y, por lo tanto, el mismo concepto de racionalidad científica tiene un significado analógico bajo las mismas condiciones. Además, la analogía concierne a la racionalidad en cuanto tal y por esta vía se evita el dogmatismo que pretende reconocer una única forma de racionalidad, así como el relativismo que desconoce cualquier forma de racionalidad. Como introducción a este análisis se ofrece una presentación de los elementos fundamentales de la doctrina de la analogía según la tradición clásica y sus concepciones actuales y luego se procede a aplicar dichos requisitos al caso de la racionalidad, llegando a precisar el concepto de racionalidad analógica. (shrink)

A través del siguiente artículo presento algunas ideas acerca de la forma en que pienso el ejercicio del terapeuta filosófico. En breves apartados planteo la necesidad de entender que la Asesoría Filosófica se debe acercar a los enfoques propuestos por la teoría general de los sistemas, por lo tanto, es preciso que se conciba su quehacer en términos de integridad y de unidad, tanto disciplinar, como en su práctica terapéutica. Para ello, abordaré aspectos generales que ayuden a comprender algunos problemas (...) de la asesoría filosófica o filosofía clínica, y luego haré una reflexión que invita a pensar, que enfoques de la teoría general de los sistemas, pueden favorecer las prácticas terapéuticas dentro de este nuevo-viejo modo de hacer filosofía. Philosophy and Unity. A Reflection on Philosophical Counseling as a systemic work Throughout the following paper I present some ideas about the way I think of the philosophical therapist’s practice. In short sections I pose the need to understand that Philosophical Counseling is to come closer to the approaches proposed by the general theory of systems, and consequently that it is to conceive its work in terms of integrity and unity, both thas discipline and in its therapeutic practice. To this aim, I will address general aspects that help to understand some problems of philosophical counseling or clinical philosophy. After that I will reflect on how approaches from the general theory of systems might favor therapeutic practices within this both new-fashioned and old-fashioned way to do philosophy. (shrink)

En este artículo revisamos la relación que se establece entre la democracia y el proyecto socialista. Debido a que las democracias actuales son predominantemente representativas de tradición liberal, también analizamos su ideal central: la libertad, en relación con el valor más importante de toda propuesta socialista: la igualdad. Nos referimos a la propuesta de Cornelius Castoriadis de un proyecto de autonomía personal y colectiva que entiende la libertad y la igualdad como propósitos políticos, por lo que la verdadera democracia se (...) identificaría con el socialismo. Palabras clave: Democracia; socialismo; libertad; igualdad; autonomía. Democracy and Socialism? An approach to Cornelius Castoriadis’ proposalIn this paper we review the relation between democracy and the socialist project. Since current democracies are predominantly representative and liberal, we also analyze their central ideal, namely, freedom, in connection with the most important value of every socialist proposal, namely, equality. We will refer to Cornelius Castoriadis’ proposal, centered on a project of personal and collective autonomy that recognizes both freedom and equality as political purposes, whereby true democracy would be identified with socialism. Keywords: Democracy; socialism; freedom; equality; autonomy. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo discuto la consistencia que elargumento de la inferencia a la mejor explicación ofrece al realismo, en particularal realismo científico. Mi trabajo está dividido endos partes. En la primera, trataré de explicar lasvirtudes del realismo, relacionándolo con la IME.En otras palabras, expondré los argumentos de porqué la IME es importante para el realismo científico.Adicionalmente mencionaré algunas definicionessobre teorías de la verdad para justificar cuál deellas es la más afín al realismo en general; y mereferiré a las diferencias (...) que existen sobre losdistintos niveles de realismo para mostrar que,por lo menos, uno de ellos puede ser compatiblecon una postura antirrealista, que en últimas esla que voy a defender. En la segunda, mostrarétres réplicas que se le pueden hacer a la IME si lointerpretamos como un razonamiento distintivodel realismo científico. El primer reparo es que losrealistas científicos incurren en un error categorialcuando hablan de términos observacionales yentidades teóricas; el segundo es que la IMEconstituye una petición de principio, siempre ycuando se use como un argumento realista; y latercera objeción consiste en mostrar que la IMEno es genuinamente un argumento exclusivo delrealismo científico ya que puede ser compatible conposturas empiristas o instrumentalistas.In this paper I try to discuss the consistencyargument that the inference to the best explanation offers to realism, in particular toscientific realism. My paper will be divided in twoparts. In the first one, I try to explain the virtuesof realism, relating it to IBE. In other words, I willdiscuss the arguments of why IBE is important forscientific realism. I also mention some definitionson theories of truth to justify which one is moreakin to realism in general. In addition, I will focuson the differences of various levels of realism toshow that, at least one of them may be compatiblewith an anti-realist position, which ultimately iswhat I defend. In the second part, I offer threereplies that can be given to IBE if we interpret it asan argument typical of scientific realism. The firstobjection is that scientific realists make a categorymistake when they talk about observation termsand theoretical entities, the second is that IBE turnsout to be a petitio principii, provided it is realisticto use it as an argument, and the third objection isthat IBE is not genuinely an argument exclusive ofscientific realism, since it may also be compatiblewith empiricist or instrumentalist views. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to analyze the convergences and divergences between two conceptions of realism: Markus Gabriel’s “new realism” and Evandro Agazzi’s realism. Firstly, the main theses behind “new realism” will be presented, drawing on Gabriel’s text ‘_Why the World Does Not Exist’_ (2015), originally published in German as _Warum es die Welt nicht gibt_ in 2013. Secondly, the constitutive aspects of realism developed by Agazzi will be explored, primarily in works such as ‘_Temas y problemas de filosofía (...) de la física’_ (1978), ‘_Filosofia, scienza e verità’_, Rusconi, Milano (1989), ‘_El bien el mal y la ciencia_’ (1996), and ‘_Filosofía de la Naturaleza. Ciencia y Cosmología’_ (2000), among others. Finally, the convergences and divergences between these two conceptions of realism will be analyzed, allowing for an inference, based on sound reasoning, about the potential novelty of the so-called “new realism”. (shrink)

En la abundante historiografía del siglo XIX mexicano hay varias explicaciones sobre las causas del colapso económico y se distinguen tres etapas: un periodo de muy bajo crecimiento entre 1820 y 1850, un periodo de retroceso absoluto entre 1850 y 1870 y finalmente una recuperación moderada a partir de la década de 1870. Una forma de articular coherentemente todas estas explicaciones consiste en poner el énfasis en la cuestión fiscal, aprovechando algunas novedades teóricas que arrojan nuevas luces sobre discusiones añejas. (...) Así se abona a la discusión sobre la formación del Estado mexicano y su relación con el desarrollo económico. (shrink)

ResumenEn este artículo me propongo realizar una defensa del naturalismo como fundamento metafísico de la ciencia, mostrando para ello que el “nuevo realismo” de Markus Gabriel es otra versión contemporánea del relativismo y del idealismo y a pesar de que Gabriel acepta la distinción fregeana de sentido y referencia, sus implicaciones son explícitamente antinaturalistas. En concreto, la defensa al naturalismo que intento ofrecer aquí es una crítica abierta a las consecuencias antinaturalistas y pseudocientíficas del “nuevo realismo” de Gabriel. Otra manera (...) de comprender este trabajo es mostrar que el naturalismo puede ser una pieza clave para entender la discusión contemporánea entre la ciencia y la pseudociencia.Palabras clave: Gabriel; naturalismo; nuevo realismo; demarcación; ciencia. (shrink)

Este artigo se inicia com a declaração de Díez e Moulines, segundo a qual é preferível dizer ‘família semanticista’ e não ‘concepção semanticista’, desde que, entretanto, os membros dessa família partilhem uma estratégia modal de apresentação e análise das teorias e, claro, de problemas metafóricos ligados a eles, ainda, entre eles não deve haver qualquer unanimidade em relação à natureza dos modelos. O estruturalismo, por exemplo, pensa os modelos como estruturas de conjunto teórico , enquanto para van Fraassen elas são (...) ‘pontos’ ou ‘trajetórias em fase de espaço’. Assim, o objetivo do presente trabalho consiste em pesquisar como é considerada a noção de modelo nesses dois membros da família semanticista, a despeito de sua relação em sua formulação inicial This article begins with the statement of Díez and Moulines, in which it is preferable to say ‘semanticist family’ and not ‘semanticist conception’, since, even though, the members of this family share a modal strategy of presentation and analysis of the theories and, of course, of metatheoric problems linked to them, also, between them there is no unanimity in relation to the nature of the models. Structuralism, for example, thinks in the models as structures of theory set , while for van Fraassen are ‘points’ or ‘trajectories in space phase’. Therefore, the aim of this paper consists to research how in these two members of semanticist family is assumed the notion of model, despite its relationship in its initial formulation. (shrink)

In recent years, new forms of transnational regulation have emerged, filling the void created by the failure of governments and international institutions to effectively regulate transnational corporations. Among the variety of initiatives addressing social and environmental problems, a growing number of certification systems have appeared in various sectors, particularly agrifood. Most initiatives rely on independent third-party certification to verify compliance with a standard, as it is seen as the most credible route for certification. The effects of third-party audits, however, still (...) need to be empirically investigated. This article provides a critical assessment of the notion of ‘evidence’ which is at the heart of auditing practices. It focuses on the case of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and fieldwork carried out in Indonesia, the world’s largest producer of palm oil. In this country, some non-governmental organizations decided to participate in the RSPO in order to use this platform to tackle the issue of land conflicts. They managed to include important clauses regarding indigenous and land rights in the RSPO standard. In practice, however, auditors rarely recognize as valid evidence the forms of proof put forward by local communities. As a result, the whole process risks compounding local power imbalances. (shrink)

El texto analiza algunas de las propuestas que las agencias internacionales más directamente relacionadas con el sector educativo han ofrecido a fin de afrontar las situaciones creadas por la pandemia de covid-19 y reactivar la educación en condiciones similares, o al menos comparables, a las que se encontraba antes de pandemia. A partir de ese análisis, se trazan conexiones entre las agendas educativas, políticas y económicas que enmarcan las respuestas actuales en términos de mediciones, evaluaciones e inversión de recursos y (...) tiempos. Al cierre, despejadas algunas dudas y aclaradas algunas decisiones, se toma distancia frente a las estrategias sugeridas por los organismos multilaterales, y se les ve desde una perspectiva que hace énfasis en las personas y las comunidades, antes que en los sistemas y en el comercio de datos, para sacar conclusiones que permitan repensar las direcciones en las que las acciones han de apuntar. (shrink)

Thinking, Language, and Experience was first published in 1989.Hector-Neri Castañeda's intricate and provocative essays have been widely influential, especially his work in epistemology and ethics, and his theory on the relation of thought to action. The fourteen essays in Thinking, Language, and Experience -- half of them written expressly for this volume -- demonstrate the breadth and richness of his recent work on the unitary structure of human experience.A comprehensive, unified study of phenomena at the intersection between experience, thinking, language, (...) and reality, this book focuses on singular reference -- that is, reference to individuals insofar as they are thought of as individuals: indicators, quasi-indicators, proper names, singular descriptions. Castañeda establishes a large number of new facts -- linguistic, semantic, psychological, and sociological -- about the workings of language in human experience, and from them develops a network of new theories, all grounded in his comprehensive Guise Theory.These theories offer a systematic account for: the structure of human experience and the world at large; the mental powers required to think of the world and to undergo experiences; self-consciousness; the language for thinking of other minds; perception and the interaction between indexical reference and perceptual fields; and the role of subjectivity in perception and intentional action. (shrink)

We have now provided an overall simple theoretical account of the structure of perceptual experience proto-philosophically examined in Part I. The next task is to find the proper logical machinery to formulatte those accounts rigorously.

This unique volume will appeal to those interested in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence as well as students of Castaneda and Latin American philosophy.